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The Public's "Right to Know": Disclosure
in the Major American Corporation
By PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG*
Boston, Massachusetts

I. INTRODUCTION
The American corporation has emerged as one of the primary sources of
power in the society, with profound impact on the lives and fortunes of those
subject to its influence. It has become a major political and social, as well as
economic, institution inseparably inter-related with the fundamental problems in the society. Corporate social responsibility-a burden of immense,
but still unknown dimensions-has become generally accepted, and participation of the large corporation in the solution of social and environmental problems is a recognized aspect of corporate affairs. In brief, "private" has become
"public." With corporate activities regarded as matters of public not merely
private concern, it is not surprising that powerful pressures have developed
for increasing the influence of the public in the corporate decisionmaking
process and for substantially increased disclosure of aspects of corporate conduct in which concerns of public policy are involved.
Commencing with Campaign GM Round I in 1970, the so-called "public
interest proxy contest" has become a frequently used technique utilizing
stockholder action for the mobilization of public pressures to influence corporate conduct.' In the three "proxy seasons" in which corporations have
faced increasing reform pressures in this form, stockholder proposals for disclosure have played a significant role and may be expected to play an even
more important role in the future.
As Professor Bowman points out, disclosure, although a less ambitious objective than proposals for organic reform in corporate structure or substantive
change in corporate policy, is a more salable idea that tends to attract more
institutional support. 2 Institutions not prepared to vote against management
on shareholder proposals pertaining to substantive matters will support pro* Member of the New York and Massachusetts Bars; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law.
This paper is the product of a study undertaken for the Investors Responsibility Research Center, Inc., which distributed to subscribers a summary review taken from that
study. The author is solely responsible for the contents of the paper, which represents
his own views and not those of the Center.
1. See, Blumberg, The Politicalizationof the Corporation,26 THE BUSINESS LAWYER
1551 (1971); Schwartz, The Public Interest Proxy Contest: Reflections on Campaign
GM, 69 MICH. L. REV. 421 (1971).

2. BOWMAN, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INVESTOR 27-28 (European Institute for Advanced Studies in Management, Working Paper 72-37, Nov. 1972).
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posals for increased disclosure. Thus, Harvard, Ford Foundation, Rockefeller
Foundation, College Equities Retirement Fund, and First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Company, among other major institutions, have supported disclosure proposals, while voting against substantive shareholder proposals.3
Disclosure serves two major purposes. As Brandeis pointed out almost 60
years ago: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the
most efficient policeman."' 4 Conduct that will prove embarrassing, if disclosed,
is avoided; the possibility of future disclosure constitutes a major element in
shaping prudent current decision. Further, greater dissemination of the facts
inevitably leads to the development of more informed public opinion and
more effective public pressures. Disclosure is not only a preventive but is an
essential element in the public evaluation of corporate performance and in
the determination of appropriate objectives for reform.
In view of the importance of disclosure and its increased prominence in the
activities of social reform groups, this paper inquires into the stockholder's
"right to know" with respect to the policies of the major American corporations in areas of social, environmental or moral concern; both his right as an
individual holder and the right of stockholders as a whole to obtain information about corporate activities. As will be seen, the question becomes a part
of the larger question of the public's "right to know," reflecting the emergence
of the large corporation as an institution of vital public importance and concern.
II. STOCKHOLDER PROPOSALS AND DISCLOSURE
The most dramatic example of the pressures of public groups to obtain information about corporate activities in the areas of social, environmental, or
moral concern has been the development of the "public interest proxy contest" utilizing stockholder proposals under Rule 14a-8 of the Securities and
3. See, Wall St. J., May 2, 1972, at 17, col. 2; May 5, 1971, at 4, col. 2; Apr. 14, 1971,
at 11, col. 5; N.Y. Times, May 1, 1971, at 68, col. 1; HARVARD TODAY, May 1972, at
15; PROJECT ON CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, NEWS AND THOUGHTS 3 (Summer 1972).
The May, 1972 statement of the President and Fellows of Harvard College illustrates
the basis of institutional support for disclosure:
"We support disclosure resolutions that are reasonable in scope because we be-

lieve that companies, their shareholders and the public will benefit from the dissemination of information on corporate actions relating to issues of broad public concern."
The statement continued "that they will, as a general procedure on disclosure resolutions, review the information which the company or others have made public and that
unless they are 'satisfied that the information is reasonably complete ... they will vote
for disclosure.'" HARVARD TODAY, May 1972, at 15. Similarly, Mr. McGeorge Bundy,
President of the Ford Foundation, has stated:
"... we believe, in general, that proposals for disclosure should be supported except when they involve an area where confidentiality is reasonable for reasons relating to fair competition or legitimate personal privacy."
(Address to Investment Company Institute, Washington, D.C., May 19, 1972.)
4. L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY 62 (Nat'l Home Library ed. 1933).
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Exchange Commission. The "public interest" stockholder proposal is intended to utilize the proxy solicitation process as a device to develop high
public interest in a public policy issue and to intensify public pressures on the
large corporation in order to influence corporate conduct in the social or environmental area.
The reform groups are not content simply to mobilize public pressures
and achieve some success in obtaining disclosure of material information
in areas of public concern. Their final objective is to have such information
receive wide dissemination through distribution to stockholders at corporate
expense because of a view that the corporate activities are of major social
or moral significance and may also have an adverse long range impact on the
corporation or corporations generally.
In a sense, such stockholder proposals may be viewed as a compression
into a single step of the more traditional procedure whereby the stockholder
first seeks to inspect corporate books and records to obtain information to
serve as a basis for communication with other stockholders and then uses
the information obtained to solicit the support of other stockholders. In the
process, the stockholder has shifted to the corporation the burden of the
identification and compilation of the information in question as well as the
burden of communication to all stockholders.
A. SEC Rule 14a-8
SEC Rule 14a-8 5 requires corporations subject to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 ("the 1934 Act") to include proposals and supporting
statements not in excess of 200 words from stockholders in the management
proxy statement distributed at corporate expense to stockholders in connection with stockholder meetings.
Effective January 1, 1973, Rule 14a-8 (c) provides that shareholder proposals may be omitted:
(1) If the proposal.., is under the laws of the issuer's domicile, not
a proper subject for action by security holders, or
(2) If the proposal:
(i) relates to... a personal claim or... grievance... ; or
(ii) consists of a recommendation, request or mandate that action be taken with respect to any matter including a general economic,
political, racial, religious, social or similar cause, that is not significantly
related to the business of the issuer or is not within the control of the
issuer; or ....
(NOTE. Proposals not within an issuer's control are those which
are beyond its power to effectuate.)
(5) If the proposal consists of a recommendation or request that the
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1972).
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management take action with respect to a matter relating to the conduct
6
of the ordinary business operations of the issuer.
Rule 14a-8 (c) does not constitute an effective barrier to stockholder proposals solely related to disclosure:
(1) Subparagraph(1) presents no problems. As will be seen, stockholder
resolutions calling for disclosure can be readily drafted in a form which will
qualify as a "proper subject" for stockholder action under state law. The
Commission has apparently concluded that a disclosure proposal, otherwise
a "proper subject" for stockholder action, may be omitted if it would involve
disclosure of information that might impair the corporation's competitive
position. Thus, in Campaign GM Round I, the Commission required that the
proposal providing for the establishment of a Shareholders Committee for
Corporate Responsibility be amended to "restrict the information to be made
available to the Committee to areas which the Board of Directors did not
deem privileged for business or competitive reasons." The Commission minute states that the amendment was deemed necessary in the opinion of the
Office of General Counsel to qualify under subparagraph (1) .7 Whether this
conclusion is sound may be debatable, but the limitation is not a significant
restriction.
(2) Subparagraph(2) is also not a bar. Although subparagraph (2) (i)
relating to "personal grievances" will in appropriate cases result in omission
of disclosure, as well as of other, stockholder proposals, 8 this problem is not
apt to arise in a "public interest" proposal. Further, disclosure of corporate
data obviously constitutes matter that is "significantly related to the business"
of the corporation and "within the control" of the corporation as required
by subparagraph 2 (ii).
(3) Subparagraph(5) creates a possible hurdle. Where the stockholders
request that management disclose information about an aspect of the ordinary corporate business, this might be barred by the reference of the subparagraph to a "recommendation or request that the management take action
with respect to a matter relating to the conduct of the ordinary business operations." Under this construction, the question would involve the relative
importance of the subject of the disclosure. Thus, the Commission has insisted on the inclusion of a shareholder proposal requesting "that a detailed
statement of the investments, income and expenses of maintaining the Pension Fund be furnished . . . in our Annual Report." 9 An alternative construction is that subparagraph (5) relates only to "action" and does not include disclosure at all.
6. SEC
REG., Oct.
7. SEC
8. SEC
9. SEC

Exchange Act Release No. 9784, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 78,997;
31, 1972, at 32179.
Minute, General Motors, Inc. (sic), File 1-143, Mar. 18, 1970.
Minute, Gains Guaranty Corp., File 0-938, Nov. 14, 1967.
Minute, Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., File 1-177, Feb. 18, 1965.

FED.
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In any event, the numerous "public interest" shareholder proposals for disclosure in 1971 and 1972 proxy statements demonstrate that neither subparagraph (5) nor the other subparagraphs impose a significant obstacle
and that properly drafted disclosure proposals cannot be omitted by management.
B. "Public Interest" Stockholder Proposals Relating to Disclosure
(1) The GeneralMotors 1971 Annual Meeting.
Stockholder action on the four stockholder proposals before the General
Motors 1971 Annual Meeting illustrates how a stockholder proposal relating
to disclosure could attract greater support than proposals pertaining to substantive matters or changes in corporate structure. Campaign GM Round II
presented three proposals, of which one involved disclosure in the Annual
Report of detailed information pertaining to minority employment, pollution, and automobile and plant safety. The Episcopal Church submitted a
fourth proposal that General Motors cease manufacturing in South Africa. 10
Although none of proposals attracted widespread support, the disclosure
proposal received support from a number of major institutions and received
2.36% of the votes cast. The other two Campaign GM proposals received
only 1.36% and 1.11% respectively and the Episcopal Church proposal
1.29% of the vote and were not supported by a number of the prominent
institutions that had favored the disclosure resolution."
The Dreyfus Leverage Fund, holding 25,000 shares of General Motors,
polled its 127,000 stockholders on their recommendation on the voting of
the shares on the four stockholder proposals. This poll also showed significantly greater support for the disclosure proposal. With 28,580 stockholders of the Fund responding, the surprising total of 45% approved the
disclosure proposal in contrast to 39 % and 30% support for the other Cam12
paign GM proposals and only 22% for the Episcopal Church proposal.
(2) The 1972 Proxy Season.
Apparently encouraged by results such as these, disclosure proposals
played a central role in the 1972 Proxy Season. Various reform groups placed
at least 34 stockholder proposals on the management proxy statements of 22'
major corporations. Disclosure proposals constituted 18 of the 34 proposals
and involved 15 of the 22 corporations in question, including American Metal
Climax, Bristol Myers, Chrysler, Eli Lilly, Ford Motor, General Motors,
Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Gulf Oil, Honeywell, International Telephone
and Telegraph, Jewel Companies, Merck, Newmont Mining, Smith, Kline

10. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT

31-41 (Apr. 5, 1971).
11. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., REPORT OF THE 63RD GENERAL MOTORS STOCKHOLDERS
MEETING 7-11 (1971).

12. Dreyfus Leverage Fund, Inc., Press Release, May 21, 1971.
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and French Laboratories, Standard Oil of California, and Warner Lambert.
Support for the disclosure proposals ranged from a high of 5.50% at Standard Oil of California to a low of 0.5% at Eli Lilly & Co.'

3

It should be

noted that the use of percentages understates the extent of support. For example, holders of approximately $450,000,000 market value of General
Motors stock voted in favor of a proposal on disclosure of its involvement
4
in South Africa, even though this represented only 2.34% of the votes cast.1
Generally speaking, the 1972 disclosure proposals attracted more support
than other "public interest" proposals on the same ballot although this was
not invariably true. In the case of Chrysler Corporation, for example, a proposal to broaden the composition of the Board received 4.91% of the votes
in comparison with 4.45% for a disclosure proposal. 15
The numbers of shares held by the reform group submitting the stockholder proposal ranged from the 12,574 shares of General Motors (with a
market value of approximately $1,000,000) held by the Episcopal Church
group submitting the South African disclosure proposal 16 to a mere 10 shares
held by the same group in American Metal Climax, Inc. in which it also
submitted a proposal. 7 Other groups held but a single share.' 8 There does
not appear to be any correlation between the number of shares held by the
sponsor and the votes cast for the proposal. It would thus seem that the fact
that the sponsor of the proposal is acting on behalf of the "public interest"
and not in support of an economic interest as a stockholder does not make
a significant difference in the reaction of other stockholders to the proposal.
(3) Voluntary Corporate Disclosure as an Alternative
to Stockholder Proposals.
The year 1972 saw a significant development in this area. Three major corporations faced with "public interest" stockholder proposals calling for disclosure agreed to disclose much of the information requested to induce the
sponsor to withdraw the proposal.
(a) Church groups submitted shareholder proposals to General Motors,
13.

ECONOMIC PRIORITIES REPORT, July-Aug.

1972, at 49-50;

KENNECOTT COPPER

(Apr. 4, 1972);
4 (1972); N.Y. Times, Apr 28, 1972, at

CORPORATION, NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT 8-9

SUMMARY REPORT OF THE ANNUAL MEETING

55, col. 4.
14.

GENERAL MOTORS CORP., REPORT OF THE 64TH GENERAL MOTORS STOCKHOLDERS

MEETING 17 (1972).
15. ECONOMIC PRIORITIES REPORT, July-Aug.

16.

1972, at 49.

GENERAL MOTORS CORP., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT

44-47 (Apr. 12, 1972).
17. AMERICAN METAL CLIMAX, INC., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT 19 (Apr. 6, 1972).
18. E.g., FORD MOTOR Co., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT
20 (Apr. 7, 1972); CHRYSLER CORP., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATE25 (Apr. 18, 1972); MERCK & Co.,
STATEMENT 17 (Apr. 27, 1972).
MENT

INC., NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY
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Goodyear Tire and Rubber, Gulf Oil, International Business Machines, Mobil Oil and Newmont Mining calling for extensive disclosure with respect to
corporate activities in Southern Africa.
International Business Machines and Mobil Oil voluntarily agreed to supply most of the information requested, and the proposals submitted to these
two corporations were withdrawn. Business & Society described the subsequent Mobil report as "a very valuable document" that "provides(s) good
hard data on which evaluations and comparisons can be made."' 9 Reaction
20
to the IBM study was less favorable.
(b) The Project for Corporate Responsibility submitted identical stockholder proposals calling for studies pertaining to the relation between drug
advertising and drug abuse to American Cyanamid, Bristol Myers, Eli Lilly,
Merck, Smith, Kline and French, and Warner-Lambert. American Cyanamid
agreed to do a study acceptable to the Project, which thereupon withdrew
21
the proposal.
Two aspects of the foregoing developments are significant. Firstly, they
represent part of a new pattern of negotiation between "public interest" or
church groups and major corporations leading to a "settlement" of demands
with respect to issues of public policy concern. Three instances involving very
large corporations and stockholder proposals have been noted above. Other
instances of the same phenomenon include "discussions" between black
groups and major corporations including General Foods Corp. and Jos.
Schlitz Brewing Co. 22 on black employment and promotion, and in the case
of WABC-TV and WNBC-TV in New York on the content of broadcast
programs as well as employment practices. 23 It is of interest that these confrontations have been described by management as "amicable" and "instructive."'24 Although the latent threat of boycott or more violent disruption implicit in the latter instances may not be present in the case of the negotiations
over stockholder proposals, the same basic pressures are at work: the corporation is seeking to accommodate itself to the climate of public opinion to
which it must adapt.
Secondly, the "public interest" or church groups are not simply interested
in disclosure of the underlying information. They want the information to
reach the public and therefore press not only for disclosure but for distribution to all stockholders as well.
19. Bus. & Soc'Y, Aug 1, 1972 at 1, The Board for World Ministries of the United
Church of Christ was "pleased with the clarity and comprehensiveness of the report."
CORPORATE INFORMATION CENTER, CORP. EXAMINER, Aug. 1972, at 4.
20. See, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1973, at 5, col. 2.
21. See, ECONOMIC PRIORITIES REPORT, July-Aug. 1972, at 51.
22. See, Bus. & Soc'y, Dec. 26, 1972 at 3; CORPORATE INFORMATION CENTER, CORPORATE EXAMINER, June 1972, at 6; Wall St. J., May 12, 1972, at 14, col. 3.

23. See, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1972, at 59, col. 1.
24. See, Wall St. J., May 12, 1972, at 14, col. 3.
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It may be expected that such negotiations and settlements will increase in
the future. So long as social and environmental problems are matters of vital
concern to the public, the large corporation will inevitably be swept up in
public controversy.
(4) 1973 Developments.
Thus, already in 1973, the Project on Corporate Responsibility has announced that it is submitting disclosure proposals relating to political contributions and to communications with White House administrative or congressional officials to Eastman Kodak Company, General Motors Corporation,
International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, and Union Oil Co. of
California.2 5 Similarly, the National Council of Churches and five other
Protestant church organizations have filed stockholder resolutions pertaining
to disclosure of activities in South Africa with 13 corporations, including Burroughs Corporation, Caterpillar Tractor Company, Chrysler Corporation,
Eastman Kodak Company, First National City Bank of New York, General
Electric Company, International Business Machines Corporation, International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, Minnesota Mining and Manu26
facturing Company, Texaco, Inc. and Xerox Corporation.
Burroughs Corporation has agreed to provide the information requested
and the stockholder proposal has been withdrawn. General Motors Corporation has also agreed to mail to all stockholders a booklet "including full disclosure of the company's involvement in South Africa. 12 7 This increases to
five the number of major corporations entering into disclosure "settlements."
This is an impressive achievement for reform groups which illustrates that
the size of the vote on the stockholder proposal is not a fair measure of the
success of the "public interest" proxy contest. Its real significance lies in its
ability to make corporate policies matters of deep public concern and thereby
to involve the public itself in the corporate decision-making process. Similarly, it inescapably confronts large institutional holders-particularly nonprofit institutions such as churches, universities, and foundations-with issues
which must be resolved in a manner satisfactory to the constituents of the
institution. The "public interest" proxy technique has thus been responsible
for a great increase in institutional concern with issues of corporate social responsibility.
Where in response to such confrontations, large institutional holders decide to support stockholder proposals, an important new element has been
introduced into the balance of forces. Since institutions are clearly more inclined to support proposals for disclosure than proposals calling for corporate
substantive action or organic change, increasing utilization of proposals involving disclosure by "public interest" and church groups has resulted.
25. See, Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1973, at 9, col. 2.
26. See, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1973, at 4, col. 2; Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1973, at 6, col.-2.

27. See, Wall St. J., Jan. 17, 1973, at 5, col. 2.
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III. DISCLOSURE THROUGH INTERROGATION OF MANAGEMENT AT THE
ANNUAL MEETING
Although the annual meeting for stockholders has been described as a
"farce" or a "ritual" or a "rubber stamp, ' 28 it serves a number of important
purposes. One of these is to provide an opportunity for interrogation of corporate officers and directors. This plays a useful role in broadening the channels and extent of corporate disclosure and could play an even more effective
role in the future. In reviewing Campaign GM, Business Week concluded
that it could convert the shareholders' meetings "into forums to debate ques'29
tions of public policy."
A. The Background
Where a corporation is not prominently associated with issues of public
policy concern, the attendance will likely be restricted to isolated stockholders
and security analysts. Thus, at the 1972 Fuqua Industries, Inc. Annual Meeting attended by only 12 stockholders, a management proposal that the annual
meeting be abolished and that stockholder action be taken by consent via
the mails as permitted by Section 228 of the Delaware General Corporation
Law was adopted with 8% of the shares opposed. 30
In contrast, where the social and environmental concerns of the corporation have achieved a certain level of public visibility, the annual meeting can
be a crowded, turbulent, and even violent affair.
Approximately 1,800 persons crowded Cobo Hall in Detroit for the 1971
Annual Meeting of General Motors and approximately 1,200 attended the
1972 Annual Meeting. 31 Professor Eisenberg properly reminds us that one
cannot generalize on the experience of General Motors and use it as a model
for corporate America as a whole. 32 Nevertheless, the experience of Dow
28. See, L.C.B. GOWER, PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 500 (3d ed. 1969);
H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS 412 (rev. ed. 1946). Rostow, To Whom and For What
Ends Is CorporateManagement Responsible? in E. MASON, ed., THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY 54 (1959).
29. Bus. WEEK, May 30,

1971, at 84. See Comment, Liberalizing SEC Rule 14a-8
Through the Use of Advisory Proposals, 80 YALE L.J. 845, 852 (1971); POWERS, ed.,
PEOPLE PROFITS-THE ETHICS OF INVESTMENT 17 (1972).
30. FUQUA INDUSTRIES, NOTICE OF ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT 6-8
(March 6, 1972). See, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1972, at 65, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Apr. 23,
1972, § 3, at 1, col. 3. The resolution was conditioned upon approval from the New
York Stock Exchange, which has not bee given. Chairman James J. Needham has
recently reaffirmed the policy of the Exchange that all listed companies will be expected
to hold annual meetings. Needham, Corporate Responsibility toward the Central Market System 9, Address to Corporate Presidents, Chicago, Ill., Dec. 7, 1972.
31. GENERAL MOTORS CORP., REPORT OF THE 63RD GENERAL MOTORS STOCKHOLDERS
MEETING, at inside front cover (1971); REPORT OF THE 64TH GENERAL MOTORS STOCKHOLDERS MEETING, at inside front cover (1972); Wall St J.., May 22, 1972, at 4, col. 2.
(1971 attendance, 1,884; 1972 attendance, 1,228.)
32. Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 44-46 (1969).
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Chemical, Honeywell, FMC Corporation, Gulf Oil, Bank of America, and
countless other companies that have been the subject of tumultuous inquiry
at annual meetings by "public interest" groups protesting their social or environmental policies confirms the extent of confrontation and publicity which
the annual meeting can achieve.3 3 Indeed, it is this very potential for public
attention that makes the proxy machinery culminating in the annual meeting
such a useful technique for the corporate activist. Aside from "public interest" and social reform groups, Lewis and John Gilbert, Wilma Soss and
Evelyn Davis have demonstrated how persons can achieve national prominence simply through manipulation of the publicity potentials of the annual
meeting.
Insofar as disclosure is concerned, the annual meeting presents an unique
opportunity to obtain an immediate answer to inquiries about social and environmental activities of the corporation. Thus, such information otherwise
not publicly available, such as the amount of corporate contributions to charitable and educational institutions, amount of expenditures for environmental
purposes, extent of black and other minority employment and similar matters, have been elicited through the direct question at the Annual Meeting. It
is evident that oral responses of this nature are no substitute for the detailed
and comprehensive information required for proper evaluation of corporate
performance. Nevertheless, this technique possesses interesting potential.
B. The Post-Meeting Report
The information disclosed at the annual meeting is readily available to
stockholders and the public as a result of the growing acceptance of the postmeeting report. For many years, the Gilbert brothers pressed management
to distribute a summary of the annual meeting to all stockholders. Like so
many of the Gilbert proposals, management after delay has recognized the
usefulness of such action. 34 Such summaries range from extensive reports devoted solely to the meeting to briefer insertions in the first quarter report to
stockholders. In either event, the information disclosed is widely disseminated.
C. Absence of Legal Requirement
The readiness to respond to questions at the annual meeting rests on no
legal requirement. It reflects the constitutional climate surrounding corporate
operations and the traditional concept of management accountability to stockholders for their stewardship. Management does not wish to appear unre33. See, e.g., THE CONFERENCE BOARD, HANDLING PROTEST AT ANNUAL MEETINGS
(1971); Wall St. J., May 3, 1971, at 6, col. 8, Apr. 2, 1971, at 6, col. 1.
34. See, L. & J. GILBERT, THIRTY-SECOND ANNUAL REPORT OF STOCKHOLDER AcTIVITIES AT CORPORATION MEETINGS DURING 1971; J. LIVINGSTON, THE AMERICAN
STOCKHOLDER

88-99 (1958).
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sponsive to stockholder inquiries and therefore frequently answers questions
it is under no legal obligation to answer and to disclose information it has not
volunteered and might prefer to keep confidential.
IV. VOLUNTARY CORPORATE DISCLOSURE IN RESPONSE TO INCREASED
PUBLIC AND STOCKHOLDER CONCERN
With increased concern with the social and environmental performance
of American corporations, public expectations and demands have developed
tremendous pressures on corporations to acknowledge their responsibility
for participation in the solution of social problems. Thus, corporate literature increasingly contains discussion of corporate performance in the area
of corporate responsibility. Although many of these efforts seem to have little
purpose other than a glossy public relations effort, a significant number constitute serious detailed summaries of corporate performance that represent
a significant advance in corporate disclosure.
A. Annual Reports
The Annual Report is the corporate publication most widely used for this.
purpose. It is now a commonplace for corporations to feature their activities
in the social and environmental area in the Annual Report and to describe
their programs extensively. The pressure to demonstrate that the corporation
both recognizes its "social obligations" and is effectively discharging them is
reflected in this response. In the process, considerable data on corporate
activities becomes available.
B. Special Publications
An increasing number of corporations have deemed the relationship of the
corporation to the community a matter of sufficient importance to prepare
and distribute special reports of corporate performance in the social or environmental area containing significant detail. General Motors' 75-page
"1972 Report on Progress in Areas of Public Concern" and 28-page report
on "Policies and Progress" distributed to all stockholders, Dayton Hudson's
annual report on its social and charitable activities "Toward Fulfilling Our
Social Responsibility"; and Quaker Oats Company's "Social Progress Plan
for Fiscal 1972," are examples of this development.
C. Communications with Security Analysts, Investors, and Public Groups
General disclosure of corporate financial information has significantly increased in the past decade, with continuing communication with portfolio
companies maintained both by analysts and institutional holders. As a greater
and greater proportion of securities is held by institutions, the links between
institutional holders and portfolio companies become of increasing importance. Some companies, such as General Motors, conduct major conferences
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attended by senior management and representatives of investment institu35
tions, universities and foundations.
Further, with the tremendous growth of litigation under the 1934 Act pertaining to misuse by insiders of corporate information and to disclosure generally, the pressures on corporate management to maintain a vigorous, continuing release of corporate information are substantial. In the light of the
exposure to potential liability in releasing information to one person and not
to another, this has inevitably meant a significant increase in the scope and
extent of disclosure to the public generally with respect to information
deemed material in the valuation of securities. With increasing recognition by
the Commission and by institutional holders that the social and environmental policies of a corporation, particularly where statutory or regulatory violations or related litigation are concerned, comprise one of the relevant
elements for investment judgment, the content of materiality for security
evaluation has significantly widened and may be expected to widen further.
This additional pressure to disclose the financial effect of social and environmental problems, where material, arising under the 1934 Act, will undoubtedly in time have reverberations that will extend to non-financial areas
of corporate information as well.
D. "Social Audits" and Corporate and Industry Surveys By "Public
Interest" Groups
The culmination of the foregoing forces is an intensive, comprehensive
summarization of the performance of the corporation in the social and environmental area generally. This is a process which has begun, has made large
strides, and may ultimately be expected to become a generally accepted feature of corporate life.
A number of corporations actively engaged in social or environmental programs, including American Telephone & Telegraph, ARA Services, Inc.,
Chase Manhattan Bank, Bank America Corp., Exxon, and Eastern Gas and
Fuel Associates are making major efforts to develop systems of internal measurement, evaluation, and control of their activities. 36 Whether or not dignified by the label of "social audit" and whether or not accomplished on a
quantitative or qualitative level, and whether or not made public, these studies
represent the early developmental stage of a framework of disclosure that
could have important implications in the future. 7 The current efforts may
well be analogized to Professor Aiken's cumbersome Mark I pioneer computer of 1944 which was the fore-runner of the infinitely more complex modern computer. A number of limited studies of this nature have been made
35.
CERN

GENERAL MOTORS CORP.,

1972

REPORT ON PROGRESS IN AREAS OF PUBLIC CON-

(Feb. 10, 1972).

36. See, B. LONGSTRETH & H. ROSENBLOOM, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 24 (1973); BUS. WEEK, Sept. 23, 1972, at 88.
37. See, R. BAUER & D. FENN, THE SOCIAL AUDIT (1972).
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public. In time, it may be expected that such studies will generally be public
documents and that the primitive social accounting of today will develop and
rival the highly sophisticated financial accounting system with which we are
all familiar.
While such internal studies are being made, considerable success has been
achieved by such external groups as the Council on Economic Priorities to
measure social and environmental performance on an industry-wide basis.
The 400 odd-page study of the Council entitled Paper Profits: Pollution in
the Paperand Pulp Industry represented an outstanding level of performance
and demonstrated the useful social service that could be rendered by a nonprofit group significantly dependent on industry co-operation for the success
of its efforts. Less successful studies of individual companies have been attempted by Mr. Nader of DuPont and the First National City Bank of New
York. 38 It is of interest that the First National City Bank in refusing to cooperate in a second Nader study pointed out that during the first study the
Bank had devoted 10,000 man-hours of banktime to cooperate with the Nader
staff. 39 Another pioneer effort in the direction of additional disclosure was the
two-day hearing conducted by the Episcopal Church with respect to a mining venture in Puerto Rico contemplated by Kennecott Copper and American
Metal Climax. 40 Although the corporations chose not to participate in the
hearings, the two days of testimony developed considerable information that
contributed to a better-informed public judgment on the problem. It is a
question how long corporations will feel free, as a practical matter, not to
participate in fact-finding exercises of this nature where they are sponsored by
respected and responsible agencies.
In the aggregate, these efforts-internal and external alike-presage the
day where full disclosure of the social and environmental, as well as financial,
policies of major business will be an accepted practice in keeping with the
"public" character of major American enterprise.
E. Disclosure by Institutional Investors
Institutional investors have not escaped the pressures which have led portfolio companies to make substantially increased disclosures about their ac38. Ms. Alice Tepper Marlin, Executive Director and Founder, Council on Economic
Priorities, comments on the study: "Interestingly, when the press reported on our findings, its heaviest criticism was not of the companies with the worst records, though
these were certainly heavily criticized. The most adverse commentary was reserved for
the companies that refused to discuss their efforts with us honestly ... the public cannot sympathize with a refusal to disclose information, to discuss problems fully and
openly. The public objects to corporate secrecy on social issues." AMERICAN INST. OF
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS,

SOCIAL MEASUREMENTS

74 (1972).

39. See, R. NADER, THE COMPANY STATE (1972); N.Y. Times, June 21, 1971, at 1,
col. 6; Wall St. J., June 21, 1971, at 2, col. 3, Nov. 30, 1971, at 16, col. 2; E.I. DuPont
de Nemours & Co. Inc., Press Release, Dec. 1, 1971; Bus. WEEK, Dec. 4, 1971 at 31;

Wall St. J. Oct. 5, 1971, at 18, col. 3.
40. See, Bus. WEEK, Feb. 13, 1971, at 29; N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1971;
ON COPPER MINING IN PUERTO RICO (1971).
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tivities. The potential power of bank trust departments and other institutional
investors to influence or control management has been the subject of exhaustive studies by the Patman Sub-Committee of the House Committee on
42
4
Banking and Currency l and by the Securities & Exchange Commission.
Recommendations that banks make more information available have been
advanced by the President's Commission on Financial Structure and Regulation as well as by the Commission.
In response to these pressures, major banks-The Bank of America, The
Chase Manhattan Bank, First National City Bank, and Morgan Guaranty
Trust Company 43-have accepted the principle that their activities are a matter of public concern requiring disclosure and have made detailed reports
of their portfolio holdings in their trust departments and in some cases their
policies in voting shares in portfolio companies. As stated in the report of the
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company:
"The continued usefulness of bank trust departments to society requires that they continue to enjoy public confidence and the support of
public opinion. These they must merit by responsible behavior and
effective performance, adequately communicated to those who are inter44
ested."
V. COMPULSORY CORPORATE DISCLOSURE UNDER THE SECURITIES ACTS
The rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Securities Act of 1933 ("the 1933 Act"), the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 ("the 1934 Act") and the Investment Companies Act of 1940
contain elaborate requirements for corporate disclosure. This regulatory apparatus seeks to accomplish three broad purposes: (a) to protect investors
in the purchase and sale of securities; (b) to assure that the proxy machinery
and solicitation process of the large corporation is conducted in the interest
of the investing public; and (c) to provide investors with relevant information
about the policies and operations of mutual funds and other investment companies, including their relation to portfolio companies.
Notwithstanding pressures from "public interest" groups, the Commission
has thus far refused to expand its disclosure requirements to include matters
pertaining to social and environmental issues, except where the information
41. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON DOMESTIC FIN., HOUSE COMM. ON BANKING & CURRENCY, 90TH CONG., lST SESS., COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THEIR TRUST ACTIVITIES:
EMERGING INFLUENCE ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (Comm. Print 1968).
42. SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 92-64, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1971).
43. BANK AMERICA CORPORATION, ANNUAL REPORT 32 (1972); THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 2-21 (1971);

FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF N.Y.,

INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT GROUP ANNUAL REPORTS FOR THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30,
1972; Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1971, at 7, col. 2; MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY, RE-

PORT OF THE TRUST AND INVESTMENT DIVISION (1972).
44. Id. at 14.
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would have a material effect on the financial condition of the corporation.
The existence of widespread public interest in a public policy issue is not
considered a relevant basis for compulsory disclosure if the public policy
concern does not constitute a material element in investor evaluation of securities.
There has been widespread institutional recognition that the inter-relationship between the large corporation's activities in areas of public policy
concern and the public's reaction to such activities constitutes an important
"input" element among others in reaching an investment decision. 45 Thus, the
report of the Committee on Business Standards of the Investment Company
Institute, CorporateResponsibility and Mutual Funds concluded that
"a general qualitative appraisal of management's corporate responsibility ...could have significant long-term investment implications. Such
considerations are simply one additional input into the investment de'46
cisionmaking process."
The Committee recommended that funds consider in their investment decisions such issues of concern as "litigation relating to compliance with Federal and State social, environmental, economic, product safety and advertising standards," employment and hiring practices generally, "activities
conducted in certain foreign countries," "product safety records," and "advertising practices."
A. Commission Guidelines and Proposed Regulations
The Commission has taken a number of steps in the direction of increased
disclosure of social and environmental information by the corporations subject to its jurisdiction.
(1) On July 19, 1971, the Commission issued releases 47 noting that the
Commission's requirements called for disclosure, if material
(a) when compliance with environmental quality or anti-pollution laws
may materially affect the earning power of the business or cause material
changes in the business;
(b) of proceedings, pending or known to be contemplated, arising under
federal, state or local environmental quality or anti-pollution laws;
(c) of legal proceedings, pending or known to be contemplated arising
under civil rights statutes, which would result in cancellation of government
contracts or termination of government business or other material sanctions.
45. See, Bus. & Soc'Y, Dec. 26, 1972, at 1;E. BOWMAN, UNIVERSITY INVESTING AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY 4-5 (1971); Fuoss, Churches v. Corporation:The Coming

Struggle for Power, A.D., Feb. 1973, at 39, 40 (14 mutual funds are reported to be
using social criteria in portfolio selection).
46. INVESTMENT COMPANY INSTITUTE, CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND MUTUAL
FUNDS 2 (1971).

47. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5170, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9252,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78, 150.
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It will be noted that the Commission requires disclosure only when a "material" effect on the corporation's financial condition is involved. The Commission concern is restricted to information of significance in the investment
decision.
(2) On December 1, 1971, the Commission announced proposed amendments to the forms prescribed for mutual funds and other investment companies under its jurisdiction to require disclosure of the funds' policies on
their involvement in the affairs of portfolio companies. 48 Areas covered under the proposal include procedures for reviewing proxy materials, soliciting
fund shareholder opinions, and general policies concerning voting or support
of management.
The proposed amendments reflect the steady increase in the percentage of
stock of listed companies held by funds and other investment companies as
well as by financial institutions generally. The New York Stock Exchange
estimated that in 1971 approximately 28.3% of the equity securities of all
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange was held by financial
institutions as a whole, of which approximately 7% of listed equity securities
was held by funds and other investment companies. 49 The monumental sixvolume Institutional Investor Study Report released by the Commission in
1971 indicates the extent of concern with the critical importance of the relation of the financial institutions to portfolio companies.
The Commission has not yet taken formal action on the proposed amendments.
(3) On February 16, 1972, the Commission announced proposed amendments to certain registration- forms under the 1933 Act and periodic report
forms under Section 12 of the 1934 Act which would in part supersede the
July 19, 1971, guidelines discussed above in regard to environmental matters. 0
The proposed amendments would require disclosure of the material effects
that compliance with Federal, State and local provisions regarding environmental protection may have upon the capital expenditures, earnings, and
competitive position of the corporation and subsidiaries. Further, all administrative and judicial proceedings arising under such Federal, State, and local
provisions would have to be disclosed, as well as material proceeding instituted by private parties. The proposed amendments would reduce the test
of materiality from 15% to 10% of consolidated current assets.
The proposed amendments are noteworthy in that they depart for the first
48. SEC Investment Companies Act Release No. 6853, SEC Securities Act Release
No. 5214, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9403, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,432; N.Y.
Times, Dec. 1, 1971, at 69.
49. N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, 1972 FACT BOOK 50.
50. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5235, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9498,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 78,524.
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time from the test of materiality as the basis for determining whether disclosure is required. All governmental proceedings must be disclosed without regard to the possible damages involved or the degree of impact on the
business. The Commission terms all such proceedings "material," although it
is obvious that this is not necessarily true for purposes of security valuation.
In this respect, the Commission is giving recognition to the growing interest
of investors in the social responsibility of the corporation and its behavior as
a "corporate citizen" even though significant financial considerations may not
be involved.
The Commission has not yet taken formal action on the proposed amendments.
On January 27, 1972, the California Commissioner of Corporations issued
Release No. 25-C requiring disclosure of capital outlays, effect on earning
power, and changes in business resulting from compliance with anti-pollution
laws as well as of legal proceedings under anti-pollution or civil rights laws in
all applications for qualification of securities. The Commissioner noted such
disclosure was required by "recent developments recognizing increased corporate social responsibilities and obligations."
B. Reform Proposals
In contrast to the Commission's insistence on the financial materiality of
the information, a number of reform proposals have called for disclosure of
corporate performance in the social or environmental area because these are
areas of concern in which disclosure might help achieve increased response to
public expectations and demands.
(1) In June 1971, the Project on Corporate Responsibility and the Natural Resources Defense Council supported by 5 other environmental groups
proposed that the Commission increase the disclosure requirements for the
sale of securities under the 1933 Act and in the corporate reports under the
1934 Act. The proponents requested that the Commission require disclosure
of the nature and extent of material environmental pollution; the feasibility
of reducing such pollution under existing technology; plans and prospects for
improving such technology; and expenditures for pollution abatement. They
also requested disclosure of minority employment policies and a breakdown
of employment according to skill; the information would be the same as that
required for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. The petition
stated that without such information on environmental pollution and minority
employment, it was "difficult, if not impossible for investors to make either
'
socially responsible or financially sound investment decisions." 51
The Commission, as noted above, took limited action on July 19, 1971, in
the direction requested but only insofar as violations of law and litigation
51. See, Wall St. J., June 10, 1971, at 22, col. 3.
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with a material effect on the corporation's financial condition were concerned.
Subsequently, on December 22, 1971, the Commission announced that it
52
would not issue the new rules requested in the petition.
The statements of Chairman Casey of the Commission made it plain that
the Commission was not then prepared to broaden its disclosure requirements
53
to assist investors to make "socially responsible" investment decisions.
(2) In October 1972, the Commission invited public comment on a petition that the Commission's rules under Section 14 of the 1934 Act be
amended to require the disclosure in proxy soliciting materials or annual reports of information required to be filed with the Congress or the Comptroller
General under the 1971 Federal Election Campaign Act concerning separate
54
segregated funds to be utilized by corporations for political purposes.
The petition is an attempt to obtain public disclosure via the 1934 Act of
corporate information filed with other governmental agencies pursuant to a
statute that does not provide for disclosure. It is noteworthy in that it attempts to broaden disclosure in the proxy solicitation materials to information unrelated to the business which will be the subject of the stockholders'
meeting. This would be a complete departure from present practice. Further,
in the alternative, it proposes that the Commission for the first time require
specific disclosure in the annual report. It has been an anomaly that to date
the annual report has not been regarded as part of the proxy solicitation materials, and the Commission has not asserted any control over the annual
report, except to require that it accompany or precede the management proxy
materials. Recent proposals, not involving social or environmental matters,
have been made that the Commission change this basic policy, but it has not
yet done so.
The Commission has not yet acted on the petition, and it is not considered
likely to act favorably.
(3) In 1970 in his review of Campaign GM Round I, Professor Donald
Schwartz advocated greater use of the proxy statement as an informationdisseminating advice.55 He recommended that the proxy rules be amended
to permit the use of the proxy statement to serve as a forum for shareholders
asking questions and obtaining answers. The proxy statement would then
serve a function as a substitute meeting and further "the shareholder's knowledge about the public impact and concerns of his corporation."
The utilization of the Commission's rule-making powers under Section 14
of the 1934 Act with respect to the proxy machinery and proxy solicitation
process rests on the Congressional intent to assure more effective voting by
stockholders. Unlike the 1933 Act, or Sections 10(b) and, perhaps, 12 of the
52. See, B. LONGSTRETH & H.

ROSENBLOOM, supra note 36, at 30.
53. See, N.Y. Times, June 18, 1971, at 53, col. 7.
54. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9822, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
55. See, Schwartz supra note 1, at 526-57.

79,068.
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1934 Act, Section 14 does not rest on the relation between disclosure and
the security valuation process. Professor Schwartz's interesting proposal is
clearly within the objectives of Section 14 of the 1934 Act and merits a degree of consideration which it has not yet received.
C. Future Role of the Commission
With the politicalization of the corporation, it seems inevitable that the
issue of public control of the large corporation will play an increasing role
in the political process generally. Such a development would unquestionably
influence the policy considerations determining the Commission's use of its
rule-making power.
One can anticipate that the question of whether Commission power should
be employed to encourage greater social responsibility on the part of corporations under its jurisdictions or to enable stockholders to take social responsibility considerations into account in investment and voting decisions
will become increasingly lively. Further, if federal incorporation or licensing
of large corporations becomes a matter of serious consideration, the question
of increased disclosure under such legislation or a wider role for the Commission in assuring disclosure in areas of public policy concern will undoubtedly occupy a prominent place on the agenda.5
VI. COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE THROUGH INSPECTION OF BOOKS AND
RECORDS
Within certain constraints, the common law provided stockholders with
substantial rights to corporate information through inspection of corporate
books and records. 57 In almost all jurisdictions, the common-law right of
inspection has been supplemented by statutory provisions.58 Thus, the stockholder has both common law and statute to support his right of inspection.
Enforcement of these rights, however, may involve substantial legal expense
and, therefore, not be available to reform groups as a practical matter.

56. See, Shanahan, Reformer: Urging Business Change, N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1971,
§ 3, at 1, col. 6; Nader, The Case for Federal Incorporation 18, Address at Conference
on Corporate Accountability, Wash. D.C., Oct. 30-31, 1971; Mueller, Corporate Disclosure and Federal Incorporation,Address at Conference on Corporate Accountability,
Wash. D.C. Oct. 30-31, 1971.
57. See, W. FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §§ 2214-19, 2222 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1967);
Bartels and Flanagan, Inspection of Corporate Books and Records in New York by
Stockholders and Directors, 38 CORN. L. Q. 289, 292 (1953); 6 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS

§ 116.02 (1972).
58. See, statutes collected in 2 ABA MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. 153 (2d ed..

ORGANIZATIONS

1971). The statutes are generally more restrictive than the common law, which Professor Hornstein describes as "much more extensive." Hornstein, Rights of Stockholders
in the New York Courts, 56 YALE L. J. 942, 946 (1947).
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A. "Proper Purpose" Required for Inspection at Common Law;
Common Law and under Almost All Statutes
In order to establish his common-law right to inspect, the stockholder must
be acting for a "proper purpose."5 9 Statutory relief, except in isolated cases
where the right to inspect is absolute, similarly depends on the establishment
of "proper purpose" either by the express terms of the statute or as a result
of judicial construction. Thus, Section 52 of the Model Business Corporation
Act and Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law expressly
require "proper purpose." Even where the statutory right of inspection contains no reference to "proper purpose," courts have, nevertheless, made it
an essential prerequisite for statutory relief. 60
To qualify as a "proper purpose," it has been traditionally observed that
the stockholder must be seeking the inspection in good faith to protect or
promote his interests as a stockholder or to perform his duties as a stockholder. He may not be acting for purposes hostile to or inimical to those of
the corporation. Finally, his purpose must be lawful (illegal schemes will
not be assisted) and reasonable (repeated inspections will not be permitted).
(1) The Stock List. Communication with other stockholders for specific
purposes pertaining to the corporation or to stockholder action have been
held to constitute a "proper purpose" justifying inspection of the stock list.
Examples include communications to solicit proxies, to influence voting, to
join in litigation, to oppose a proposed merger, to form a protective committee, or to solicit shares pursuant to a tender offer. 61
(2) Books and Records Generally. Examples of a "proper purpose" for
inspection of other books and records have included inspections:
(a) To determine the value of the petitioner's stock;
(b) To ascertain how the corporation's affairs have been managed, to
assist the stockholder in voting for directors or in taking other action as a
stockholder;
(c) To ascertain if the corporation has been mismanaged, or to determine
whether litigation or other action should be instituted;
(d) To determine the advisability of a receivership;
(e) To ascertain the justification for non-payment of dividends.
(3) Denial of Inspection. Inspection has been denied when the purpose
has been to aid a competitor, to further the stockholder's personal inter59. See, Note, "ProperPurpose" for Inspection of Corporate Stock Ledger, 1970
DUKE L.J. 393; Purposes for which Stockholder or Officer May Exercise Right to

Examine Corporate Books and Records, Annot., 15 A.L.R.2d 11 (1951).
60. E.g., State ex rel Theile v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. 514, 115 A. 773 (1922);

Tate v. Sonotone Corp., 272 App. Div. 103, 69 N.Y.S. 2d 535 (1947); Slay v. Polonia
Pub. Co., 249 Mich. 609, 229 N.W. 424 (1950).
61. See, Note, "Proper Purpose" for Inspection of Corporate Stock Ledger, 1970
DUKE L.J. 393; Newman, Inspection of Stock Ledgers and Voting Lists, 16 Sw. L.J. 439
(1962); Schwartz, supra note 1, at 492-94.
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ests-such as his speculation in securities or use of the stockholder list for
commercial purposes or for advancement of his brokerage business-to
assist in personal litigation in which he is involved, to harass or annoy the
corporation, or for "idle curiosity." :'
It is apparent that for purposes of "proper purpose," interest as a stockholder has been traditionally related to the economic aspects of the relationship and of the conduct of the corporation's business.6 2 This sharply presents
the question of whether "proper purpose" may exist if the stockholder's concern arises out of non-economic considerations. Such a case was presented
by the recent Honeywell decision.
B. The Honeywell Case
The most recent decision of moment involving the shareholder's right to
inspect and the only decision involving an issue of corporate social responsibility is State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc.6 3
In the Honeywell case, the petitioner purchased 100 shares with "the sole
purpose ... to give himself a voice in Honeywell's affairs so he could persuade Honeywell to cease producing munitions." The 100 shares were registered in the name of a nominee. Upon discovering this, petitioner purchased
one additional share in his own name. He also learned that he had a contingent beneficial interest in a trust which held 242 shares.
Petitioner demanded access to the "original shareholder ledger, current
shareholder ledger, and all corporate records dealing with weapons and munitions manufacture." Upon Honeywell's refusal, petitioner brought a mandamus action in Minnesota. The trial court applied Delaware law, since
Honeywell was a Delaware corporation. 64 Although the petitioner alleged
that he desired to inspect the stockholder ledger in order to communicate
with other shareholders "to elect a new board of directors" who might represent his viewpoint, the trial court denied inspection both of the stock list
and of the corporate records. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Minnesota
affirmed. The Court intimated that plaintiff was not entitled to inspection because his stock interest was "quite tenuous" and had been acquired "for the
sole purpose of asserting ownership privileges in an effort to force Honeywell
to cease [such] production" of anti-personnel weapons. 65 It held that "petitioner had not demonstrated a proper purpose germane to his interest as a
62. The commentary on Sec. 52 of the Model Business Corporation Act, which does
not discuss social responsibility, states: "The right to inspect corporate books and records is given to protect a shareholder's economic interest in the corporation," 2 ABA
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT. ANN. 129 (2d ed. 1971).
63. 291 Minn. 322, 191 N.W. 2d 406 (1971), 25 VAND. L. REV. 425 (1972),

TUL. L. REV. 1002 (1972).

46

64. The Supreme Court held that it was not necessary to determine whether Delaware law or Minnesota law applied because the test under Delaware law applied by the
trial court was identical with the Minnesota common law. The Honeywell brief stated
that it is "clear" that Delaware law controls.
65. 291 Minn. at 389, 191 N.W. 2d at 411. This issue is reviewed in the Appendix.
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stockholder." The Court based its decision on the finding that petitioner's
"sole purpose was to persuade the company to adopt his social and political
concerns, irrespective of any economic benefit to himself or Honeywell. '66
The soundness of the decision that at this stage of the development of
American business economic considerations are the sole legitimate concern
of stockholders in reviewing the performance of the corporation and in determining their responsibilities as stockholders is very doubtful. It ignores
the widespread acceptance of the concept of corporate social responsibility.
The decision, however, rests on a relatively narrow ground. Although a few
sentences in his brief referred to petitioner's view that Honeywell's conduct
was "bad business," petitioner had not established his concern with the impact of public reaction to Honeywell's manufacture of anti-personnel weapons
upon the corporation's economic position. Thus, as institutional investors
have come to recognize, the social and environmental policies of a corporation and the public's reaction to such policies are a significant element to be
considered in the evaluation of the corporation's securities. The Court was
familiar with this development and made it plain that in such event a "proper
purpose" for the inspection would exist, stating:
"We do not mean to imply that a shareholder with a bona fide investment interest could not bring this suit if motivated by concern with the
long- or short-term economic effects on Honeywell resulting from the
6' 7
production of war munitions.
The Honeywell decision is not particularly important because of the narrow base of its holding. If, however, other courts do not read the decision
closely, the net effect of the petitioner's crusade for social responsibility may
be to create an additional hurdle for other stockholders desiring to inspect
books and records for reasons that include concern with issues of public
policy.
(1) Inspection of the Stock List.
As far as the stock list is concerned, the Honeywell decision is plainly
wrong in its refusal to grant inspection. The petitioner's purpose to inspect
the stock list to be able to communicate with other stockholders for the purpose of election of directors is clearly a "proper purpose" both under Delaware law and common law.6 8 The Court has confused the "purpose" of the
inspection-i.e., the intended use of the stock list-with the motivation for
petitioner's action. Thus, in a recent decision involving a demand for the
stock list to communicate with other stockholders on matters of mutual in66. Id.
67. 291 Minn. at 330, 191 N.W. 2d at 412.
68. E.g., Nationwide Corp. v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co., 251 Minn. 255, 87
N.W.2d 671 (1958); Murchison v. Alleghany Corp., 27 Misc. 2d 290, 210 N.Y.S.2d
153 (Sup. Ct. 1960), afl'd, 12 App. Div. 2d 753, 210 N.Y.S.2d 975, app. denied, 12
App. Div. 2d 903, 212 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1960); Feist v. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co., 30
N.J. Super. 153, 103 A.2d 893 (1954). See also, note 61 supra, notes 69, 82 infra.
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terest and to solicit proxies, the Delaware Supreme Court expressly held that
to the extent the Honeywell case was inconsistent, it was inconsistent with
Section 220 "as properly applied."6 9
As for the motivation behind plaintiff's acts or the program of which the
inspection forms a part, the-cases have made it plain that a petitioner entitled to inspect because of a "proper purpose" is not barred because he may
70
have other purposes as well.
(2) Inspection of Corporate Records.
The right of inspection of the books and records "dealing with weapons
and munitions manufacture" presents a more difficult question than inspection of the stock list. Although the Delaware statutory provisions are the same
(except with respect to the burden of proof), the Court's decision as to the
existence of a "proper purpose" may be different because of the different
nature of the interests to be balanced. First, there is a dramatic difference
in the extent of intrusion into the corporation's affairs and the possible injury to the corporation. Second, unlike the stock list, where a purpose to
communicate with the other holders for the election of directors will support
the inspection, the right to inspect the books and records generally must rest
on the relation of the information resulting from the inspection to the protection or promotion of his interest as a stockholder.
As noted, the interrelationship of Honeywell's manufacture of anti-personnel weapons and the impact of the resulting climate of public opinionexpressed in such economic considerations as consumer resistance and boycotts, difficulties of recruiting and retaining personnel and poor public relations generally-upon its business and the investment value of its shares
would provide the basis for inspection, on which petitioner surprisingly did
not choose to rely. It may be noted that in order to avoid this difficulty, the
1971 shareholder proposal of Episcopal Bishop Hines that General Motors
terminate business operations in South Africa relied on the economic risk to
General Motors from possible loss of its investment rather than on moral
71
considerations.
With this element removed from the case, the pure question presented in
the Honeywell case is whether a stockholder has a right to inspect corporate
records out of concern for Honeywell's obligations of corporate social responsibility in the operation of its business and for his own social responsibility as a stockholder.
69. Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Credit Bureau of St. Paul, Inc., 290 A.2d 691,
692 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1972).
70. General Time Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 43 Del. Ch. 531, 533, 240 A.2d
755, 756 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Kerkorian v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 253 A.2d 221, 225
(Del. Ch.), afl'd, 254 A.2d 240 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1969); Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air
Brake Company, 56 Misc. 2d 538, 288 N.Y.S.2d 984 (Sup. Ct. 1968). See, E. FOLK,
DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 252-53 (1972).

71. See, note 10 supra, at 39-40 ("Apartheid creates an extreme risk of eventual turmoil and instability in South Africa, which makes investment there excessively risky").
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(3) Inspectionfor other than Economic Reasons.
There are apparently only 3 decisions that involve a stockholder's right of
inspection for other than economic reasons.
De Rosa v. Terry Steam Turbine Co.,72 not mentioned by the Honeywell
Court (or in the briefs before it), involved a demand to inspect the stock list
made by three members of a union negotiating committee who held one share
each. The shares had been purchased with union funds, and the union received the dividends on the stock. The purpose of the demand was to enable
the union committee to communicate at union expense with stockholders on
aspects of the corporation's labor relations policies, including such issues as
the absence of an arbitration provision and no-strike clause in the union contract, employee turnover, a cumbersome and costly incentive pay plan, and
inefficient production methods.
The Connecticut statute made the stock list available for inspection
by any shareholder . . .for any proper purpose in the interest of the

shareholder as such or of the corporation and not for speculative or
trading purposes or for any purpose inimical to the interest of the cor73
poration or its shareholders.
The demand of the union committee members incorporated the statutory
language. The Court granted inspection, holding that the labor relations issues
were "matters of interest and legitimate concern to the shareholders and to
the company. ' 74 The purpose was held proper and not inimical to the interest
of the corporation or of its shareholders notwithstanding the relation of the
three petitioners to the union and their single shares of stock.
In the Honeywell case, the Court denied relief because petitioner's "sole
purpose was to persuade the company to adopt hi§ social and political concerns, irrespective of any economic benefit to himself or Honeywell." In the
De Rosa case, it is clear that the union men were not seeking to benefit themselves as stockholders, but were acting on behalf of the union members generally. Similarly, although it may be argued that the communication with the
shareholders may lead to better labor relations which may benefit the corporation, it is equally clear that the union men were advancing union interests
and not concerned with economic benefit to the corporation. The De Rosa
decision is inconsistent with the Honeywell case. Although it involves inspection of the stock list, the decision upholding inspection although it would
not further the economic interests of the corporation or applicants as stockholders obviously supports inspection of the books and records as well.
Wolozyn v. Begarek7 5 involved a religious corporation in which a demand
for inspection was based on dissatisfaction with the dogma, doctrines and
72. 26 Conn. Supp. 131, 214 A.2d 684 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1965).
73. 26 Conn. Supp. at 134-35, 214 A.2d at 687.
74. 26 Conn. Supp. at 138, 214 A.2d at 688.
75. 378 P.2d 1007 (Okla. 1963).
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form of religious services of the dominent faction within the church. The
Court assumed that the Oklahoma Business Corporation law applied. It held
that inspection was not for a proper purpose under the statute because it
was unreleated to any realistic suspicion of mismanagement of church funds
or property and involved questions of religious belief and practice more
suited for church tribunals than for the courts. Although this decision is consistent with the theory that "proper purpose" must rest on economic considerations, it is questionable whether it may be applied outside of the church
area.
Finally, in McMahon v. DispatchPrintingCo., 76 the Court denied inspection of books and records where the petitioner was motivated by a "political feud" with the President of the corporation who was also Secretary of
State of New Jersey. The Court found that the petitioner's purpose was to
defeat the President in the political arena, even if the corporation was harmed
in the process and that inspection was unrelated to his interest as a shareholder.
Although the issue presents relatively new ground for decision, courts may
ultimately have to decide whether in the present climate of public opinion,
moral or social considerations-where, if ever, they can be isolated and divorced from investment considerations-are fundamental matters of legitimate concern for stockholders and management alike. In this area, the Honeywell court has misread the significance of the recent decades in American
economic life. As long ago as 1953, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in the
well known decision in A.C. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, stated: "Modern
conditions require that corporations acknowledge and discharge social as
well as private responsibilities as members of the communities within which
'' 7
they operate.
More recently, in Medical Committee for Human Rights v. Securities and
Exchange Commission,7 8 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
noted that the decision by the Dow management to manufacture napalm did
not rest on economic considerations. It pointed out that "management in
essence decided to pursue a course of activity, which generated little profit
for the shareholders and actively impaired the company's public relations and
recruitment activities because management considered this action morally
and politically desirable. '79 May not moral and political considerations govern the actions of stockholders as well as of management?
This question relates to the modem role of stockholders in the corporation
as well as to the corporation itself. Indeed, the traditional concept of the right
to inspect rests not only on the promotion of the stockholder's interest as a
76. 129 A. 425 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1925).
77. 13 N.J. Eq. 145, 154, 98 A.2d 581, 586 (1953), appeal dismissed, 364 U.S. 86

(1953).
78. 432 F.2d 659 (D.C. Cir. 19,70), vacated as moot, 404 U.S. 403 (1972).
79. Id. at 681.
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stockholder but to enable the stockholder to discharge his function as a stockholder.80 The question thus becomes whether, in the present climate of opinion, stockholders may legitimately rely on a sense of social responsibility as a
criterion for their action as stockholders without regard to economic considerations. Are social or moral concerns in themselves sufficient?
In this connection, it may be noted that the Committee on Economic Development has reported, that according to a relatively recent poll, two-thirds
of the American public believed that "business now has a moral obligation
to help other major institutions to achieve social progress, even at the expense
s
of profitability."'
Although extreme examples may be of limited usefulness, it may be helpful to view the issue in a somewhat different context. Let us assume a case
in which corporate management has decided to broaden the business of the
corporation to include the conduct of gambling or prostitution in jurisdictions
where such conduct is lawful (and indeed may be encouraged by the local
government) because of the short and long-term profits which are anticipated.
Does a stockholder opposed to such conduct purely for moral reasons have
the right to inspect the stock list to communicate with other holders in order
to elect directors committed to another policy or to inspect the corporate records to obtain complete disclosure of the facts with respect to such operations?
Are moral values in and of themselves in this area of the law a relevant guide
to the conduct of modern man? In brief, this is the narrow issue in the Honeywell case.
At the risk of repetition, it is worth repeating that these issues are rarely
matters solely of moral concern. Where corporate conduct involving moral,
social or environmental issues becomes a matter of public controversy, the
impact on the corporation has economic significance, of concern to management and investors alike. Sales, employee recruiting, morale, and turnover,
investor psychology and ultimately valuation of the corporation's shares are
all affected. Social and moral concerns are no longer the only factors to be
taken into account. At this point, as even the Honeywell Court recognized,
traditional rights of inspection are clearly available to stockholders.
C. The Future of the Right of Inspection
The effective, timely right to inspect the stockholder list in the large corporation is now firmly established as a result of the recent decisions in Delaware.8 2 In view of the importance to the stockholder, the lack of inconve80. See, State ex rel. Watkins v. Cassell, 294 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Mo. App. 1956);

State ex rel. McClure v. Malleable Iron Range Co., 177 Wis. 582, 187 N.W. 646, 648
(1922); Stone v. Kellogg, 165 Ill. 192, 46 N.E. 222, 226 (1896).
81. COMM. FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF BUSINESS

16 (1971).
82. E.g., Mite Corp v. Heli-Coil Corp., 256 A.2d 855 (Del. Ch. 1969); General Time

CORPORATIONS

Corp. v. Talley Industries, Inc., 43 Del. Ch. 531, 240 A.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1968);
Kerkorian v. Western Air Lines, Inc., 253 A.2d 221 (Del. Ch.), afl'd, 254 A.2d 240
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1969).
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nience to the corporation, and the absence of any threat to legitimate corporate interests, this result is eminently sensible. One may expect that further
litigation over the right to inspect the stock list will dwindle.
The future development of the right to inspect books and records on the
other hand may be quite different insofar as the large publicly held corporation is concerned.
In the closely held corporation, the stockholder's right of inspection of
books and records is an essential component of the constitutional structure
of the enterprise. 83 It provides an important safeguard against oppression of
minority stockholders without presenting a significant danger to the normal
functioning of the corporation. The number of stockholders will generally
be so small that implementation of the inspection right will not threaten corporate operations.
The large publicly held corporation presents a sharp contrast that represents a difference in kind not merely a difference in degree. The numbers of
stockholders in the large corporation are so large that even the slightest
change in stockholder patterns of enforcing the right of inspection could present serious problems for the corporation. Thus, the 50 most widely held
corporations listed on the New York Stock Exchange, as of early 1972, had
more than 121,000 stockholders of record ranging from the largest, American
Telephone and Telegraph, with 3,010,000 holders of record, to the fiftieth,
84
R.J. Reynolds Industries, with 121,000 holders as follows:
Number of Shareholders of Record
1,000,000 or more
500,000 to 999,999
250,000 to 499,999
150,000 to 249,999
121,000 to 149,999

Number of Corporations
2
3
8
21
16

In view of the significant number of nominee and "street name" holders of
record, the number of beneficial owners is obviously substantially larger than
the holders of record.
It is evident that a relatively small number of stockholders seeking to enforce their right of inspection of books and records of the major American
corporations could create serious difficulties. Thus, as was pointed out in
Cooke v. Outland:
"Considering the huge size of many modern corporations and the
83. See, 1 F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.63 (1972 Supp.);
Galler v. Galler, 45 Ill. App. 2d 452, 465-66, 196 N.E.2d 5, 12 (1964), Modified, 32 Ill.
2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1965) ("It is even more important in the close corporation ...
that every shareholder should be able to compel an inspection of corporate records. ..").
84. N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, 1972 FACT BOOK,at 31.
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necessarily complicated nature of their bookkeeping, it is plain that to
permit their thousands of stockholders to roam at will through their records would render impossible not only any attempt to keep their records
efficiently, but the proper carrying on of their business." 85
Corporate counsel might be able to limit the impact of any such development
by persuading the courts that shareholder efforts of this nature, particularly
where they reflected concerted action, constituted a form of harassment and
therefore did not have a "proper purpose." The spectre nevertheless, arises
that the system is simply unworkable in the large corporation with its tens
of thousands of stockholders. It is somewhat surprising that corporate critics
eager to challenge the major corporation on public policy issues have not
attempted this tactic.
Properly drafted demands by stockholders of indisputable standing to inspect the books and records of major corporations to review their activities
in areas of public policy concern ,which have become matters of significant
public interest obviously could create administrative problems of major
proportions. On the corporate level, a possible response might well be a
significant increase in voluntary disclosure and in cooperation with social
reform groups pressing for further information in an effort to avoid the problem. On the legislative level, encouraged by corporate management, or on
the judicial level, another possible reaction to such a movement might be the
creation of additional restraints on the right of inspection to render the system
workable.
VII. COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE THROUGH RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED AT
STOCKHOLDERS' MEETINGS
Quite distinct from the right of the individual stockholder to inspect books
and records is the right of the stockholders as a body to corporate disclosure.
The power of stockholders as a body to compel disclosure by resolution
adopted at a meeting of stockholders called upon proper notice and with a
quorum in attendance involves the fundamental allocation of powers among
the various organs of the corporation-stockholders, directors, and officersunder corporation law. In brief, is a stockholder resolution to obtain disclosure a "proper subject" for stockholder action under state law? This is a question of corporate constitutionalism.
There is remarkably little judicial guidance on the meaning of "proper subject."86 The question has rarely been litigated.
In the leading case of Matter of Auer v. Dressel, the New York Court of
85. 265 N.C. 601, 611, 144 S.E.2d 835, 842 (1965).
86. E.g., Matter of Auer v. Dressel, 306 N.Y. 427, 118 N.E.2d 590 (1954); SEC v.
Transamerica Corp. 163 F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947). See, Clusserath, The Amended Stockholder ProposalRule: A Decade Later, 40 NoTRE DAME LAW. 13, 17-26 (1964).
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Appeals held that a recommendation by shareholders to the directors with
respect to a matter on which shareholders could not act-the election of a
President-nevertheless, constituted a "proper subject." Similarly, a request
by stockholders for information which would serve as the basis for recommendations to the Board would also appear to constitute a "proper subject"
for stockholder action.
Further, stockholders are the owners of thelenterprise. They constitute the
ultimate plenary source of power of the corporation, 8 7 except where power
has been allocated to the directors by statute or by the certificate or by-laws.
(A prime example is the traditional statutory provision allocating to the
Board of Directors the power "to manage the business and affairs of the corporation." 88s ) The power to demand information about the business of the corporation is clearly within the plenary powers of shareholders.
Since such power to demand information rests with the stockholders as a
body and may be exercised only by a majority vote at a meeting, it would
be solely of academic interest in the large public corporation, but for its interrelationship with Rule 14a-8 of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
The fact that a demand for information is a "proper subject" for stockholder
action under state law is the foundation for stockholder disclosure proposals
under the Rule.
VIII. COMPARISON OF THE STOCKHOLDER'S RIGHT OF INSPECTION AND
STOCKHOLDER PROPOSALS INVOLVING DISCLOSURE
There are fundamental differences between the right of inspection and the
stockholder disclosure proposal.
(a) As noted, the right of inspection is a right that pertains to the individual stockholder, while the stockholder disclosure proposal rests on the
plenary right of the stockholders as a whole to take action they believe to be
in their best interests.
(b) The process is different. The right of inspection means physical access
to the corporate records by the stockholder, accompanied by attorneys, accountants, clerks, and secretaries. 89 It.inevitably results in disruption of the
corporation's operations through the temporary unavailability of records
undergoing inspection and of personnel to supervise the "outsiders" involved
in the inspection.
Further, it undoubtedly means the disclosure of some information unre87. See, L.C.B. GOWER, supra note 28, at 474, 501; Z. CAVITCH, supra note 57,
§ 116.01, at 363 n.8, 371 n.15.
88. E.g., Del. Gen. Corp. Law § 141; N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 701; ABA-ALI
Bus. CORP. ACT § 35.
89. E.g., Conerty v. Butler County Oil Ref. Co., 301 Pa. 417, 152 A. 672 (1930);
Shea v. Parker, 234 Mass. 592, 126 N.E. 47 (1920); Commonwealth ex rel. Wilde v.
Pennsylvania Silk Co., 267 Pa. 331, 110 A. 157 (1920); Ellsworth v. Dorwart, 95 Iowa
108, 63 N.W. 588 (1895).
MODEL
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lated to the subject for which inspection was granted, as well as the possibility of disclosure of trade secrets, confidential data, or information damaging to the corporation's competitive position. 90 In contrast, as noted, the
Commission staff has restricted the scope of stockholder disclosure proposals
to areas not deemed "privileged for business or competitive reasons." These
limitations are undoubtedly more restrictive than the limitations imposed by
judicial order in an inspectioil proceeding.
Finally, it involves the release of information to a particular applicant for
his own use rather than for dissemination to stockholders generally and thus
to the public. None of the foregoing considerations is present under the stockholder disclosure proposal where management prepares the compilations
and summaries of data required without interruption or intrusion by "outside"
persons and where the information is distributed to the stockholders as a
whole.
(c) The right of inspection rests on the "standing" and the "purpose" of
the particular stockholder instituting the action. As noted, this renders the
right of inspection dependent, among other matters, on the nature of the
stockholder's stock interest, his association with competing firms, his purpose
in seeking the information, and possible injury to the corporation. In contrast, the stockholder disclosure proposal involves the power of the stockholders as a whole to demand information about aspects of the business of
which they are the owners.
In summary, the right of inspection depends on a balancing of considerations reflecting the inspection process itself and the individual stockholder
seeking to assert the right. Thus, the right of inspection in a particular case
may be doubtful or perhaps not even exist at all by reason of factors which
may have no relation whatsoever to the nature of the information for which
disclosure is sought.
IX. OTHER AVENUES OF COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE
The individual shareholder may obtain disclosure through other avenues
in addition to his common-law and statutory right to inspect the books and
records of the corporation.
A. Pre-trial Procedures Incident to Litigation Against the Corporation
Where the stockholder institutes litigation against the corporation, he is
entitled as a litigant to extensive pre-trial discovery proceedings to prepare
for trial. Such proceedings extend a right to information which transcends
the limitations and prerequisites pertaining to the stockholder's common law
or statutory right to inspect books and records. Thus, Rule 26 of the Federal
90. Cf., e.g., State ex rel. Gwinn v. Bucklin, 83 Wash. 23, 145 P. 58 (1914); Nationwide Corp. v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co., 87 N.W.2d 671 (Minn. 1958); 28 U.
CIN. L. REv. 116 (1959).
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Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to discovery goes far beyond the traditional right to inspect. 91
B. Statutory Access to Filed Information
Statutes requiring the filing of corporate reports or submission of other
information may make the information available to stockholders or the public. This can supplement other opportunities for access to corporate information.
(1) Tax Returns. Although federal corporate tax returns are confidential,
Section 6103 (e) of the Internal Revenue Code makes them available upon
request to any holder or holders of one (1% ) percent or more of the outstanding common shares. Further, the Securities and Exchange Commission
has recently proposed that the financial reports to the Commission under the
1934 Act and registration statements under the 1933 Act explain any significant differences between the preparation of financial statements for book
purposes and use in the federal corporate tax return. 92 With these reports
available for public inspection, this disclosure will enable stockholders and
other interested analysts to reconstruct the tax return in significant measure.
(2) Other Statutes. Numerous federal statutes and administrative regulations contain elaborate reporting and filing requirements. The Securities and
Exchange Commission, for example, requires extensive disclosure of financial
information and transactions involving insiders as part of its statutory mandate to protect investors. These elaborate disclosures under the 1933 Act
with respect to any "public offering" of securities and under Sections 12 and
14 of the 1934 Act with respect to quarterly, semi-annual and annual reports
to the Commission, as well as to proxy statements, are available to the public.
Indeed, through its micro-fiche program instituted a number of years ago,
all such information pertaining to a designated company will be automatically
forwarded by the Commission to interested persons on a subscription basis
immediately. 93 Similarly, in the various regulatory agencies seeking to impose
uniform accounting practices on the industries within their jurisdiction, such
as the Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Power Commission, Federal Communications Commission, and Civil Aeronautics Board, detailed
corporate reports are available for public inspection.
Many other federal regulatory programs require the filing of detailed reports on relevant aspects of the corporation's business but provide that such
filings be kept confidential by the agency. Such examples include the Employer Information Report EEO-1 on minority employment practices filed
91. See, 6 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 57, at § 116.01, at 364 n. 12 ("inspection under pretrial discovery is far broader and much more comprehensive").
92. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5344, SEC Exchange Act Release No. 9915,
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 79,145.
93. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 8345, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 77,571.
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with the Federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Affirmative Action Compliance Program filed with the Office of Federal Contract
Compliance, the water pollution data filed under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, and many of the reports on work-related deaths, injuries
and illnesses under the Federal Occupational Safety and Health Act.
These are all relatively new enactments and the provisions for confidentiality of corporate information reflect an accommodation with corporate antagonism to the programs. This should be regarded as only the initial phase.
As the programs become accepted, it may be expected that much of this information will ultimately become available to the public.
C. Disclosure Through Stock Exchange Regulation
The stock exchanges exert substantial regulatory control over the relationship between listed corporations and their shareholders. Thus, in a number of
important respects, either by formal requirement in the listing agreement or
through influence, the New York Stock Exchange and the American Stock
Exchange have established standards for corporate operation safeguarding
stockholder rights that transcend the requirements of state corporation law.
Thus, the New York Stock Exchange has effectively prohibited the use of
non-voting common stock, required stockholder approval for the issuance
of new shares exceeding 20% of the outstanding shares or issued in connection with a "change of control," required stockholder approval of acquisitions
from insiders and stock options for executives, and has pressed for the elec94
tion of at least two "outside" directors on the Board.
With the election of public governors by both exchanges, this highly salutary trend may be expected to increase. Any increased regulation of listed
corporations will undoubtedly embrace increased disclosure. Thus, Mr. Theodore Cross, a newly elected public governor of the American Stock Exchange,
has already suggested that the exchanges (and the National Association of
Securities Dealers) require listed corporations (or corporations with shares
traded over-the-counter) to disclose their federal Equal Employment Opportunities Commission Statements of compliance with anti-discrimination statutes.9 5
X. UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE BY CORPORATE EMPLOYEES
With increasing expression of a new view of the large American corporation as a social institution to achieve social objectives, rather than as an economic institution to be operated solely for economic objectives for the benefit
of stockholders, it is inevitable that new views will also emerge with respect
to the changing relation between the corporation and its employees. Tradi94. N.Y. STOCK EXCH., MANUAL, at A-95, A- 118, A-280, A-284; N.Y. STOCK EXCH.,
THE CORPORATE DIRECTOR AND THE INVESTING PUBLIC 7 (1965).
95. Cross, Closing Down Markets for Discrimination, Bus. & Soc'y REV. (Winter,
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tional concepts of the duties of loyalty and obedience of the employee to his
employer, firmly recognized in the law of agency, seem to be breaking down.
Numerous recent developments have illustrated the pressures on the employee
of the large corporation to take action adverse to the interests of his employer
by unauthorized disclosure or other means in response to the employee's view
as to the proper social responsibility of his corporate employer. The corporate
"leak" has joined the government "leak" as an established aspect of American life.
Thus, Mr. Ralph Nader has established a Clearing House for Professional
Responsibility to solicit and receive disclosures from employees of large
corporations, as well as of government, of information about their "employers' policies or practices that they consider harmful to public or consumer interests." ' 96 Mr. Nader has termed this "whistle-blowing" and urges
such unauthorized disclosure whenever the employee concludes his "respon'97
sibility to society transcends responsibility to his organization.
As employees respond to pressures such as these, important additional
sources of disclosure about the social and environmental activities of large
corporations will become available.
This development, which obviously presents serious problems and will require the establishment of new legal rules to reflect changing social values
is discussed at length in Blumberg, "Corporate Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry," 24 Okla.
L. Rev. 279 (1971).
X1. CONCLUSION
Disclosure of corporate activities in the social and environmental sphere
as a means of influencing or controlling corporate conduct is a constraint on
corporate power in the American tradition. The outer limits on corporate
behavior have in large measure been determined by a sense of what is regarded as socially acceptable conduct, as much as by law. The climate of
public opinion is an almost irresistible pressure in the long run. Increased
disclosure is obviously a powerful element in the formation of public opinion
and in the development of public pressures to accomplish social objectives.
It is, therefore, an important component of the present scene which can play
a major role in determining the form of the changing rules of the game under
which the large public corporation will have to operate in the future.

96. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1971, at 32, col. 3.
97. N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1971, § 6, col. 5. See, R.
WELL, eds., WHISTLE BLOWING (1972).
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Appendix
The Honeywell Case and the Stockholder's Standing
to Assert a Right of Inspection

In the Honeywell case, the petitioner was the owner of record of only one
share. In addition, he was the beneficial owner of 100 shares, with a cost of
approximately $13,000, held in the name of his nominee and had a contingent remainder interest in a trust owning 240 shares. This poses the following
questions:
(a) Does ownership of one share of record qualify petitioner for relief
under the Delaware statute, assuming it is applicable?
(b) Does such ownership of one share of record together with beneficial
ownership of 100 shares in nominee name and a remote equitable interest in
the 240 shares held by the trust qualify petitioner for relief at common law?
(c) Is petitioner barred from relief either under the statute or at common
law because the 100 shares in nominee name and the one share in his own
name were purchased solely for the purpose of obtaining the right of inspection in question?
A. Small Size of the Holding
(1) The DelawareStatute. Since the Delaware statute, Section 220 of the
General Corporation Law, extends only to stockholders "of record," petitioner's case under the statute must rest on the record ownership of a single
share purchased to obtain the right of inspection.
This, nevertheless, would not appear to deny petitioner a right to relief
under the statute. Section 220 expressly provides for inspection by "[A]ny
stockholder" of record. It contains no requirement of a required minimum
number of shares or of a minimum time period in which stock must be held
for relief. This is particularly significant because of the many state statutes
which expressly condition the right of inspection on such prerequisites. 8 Professor Folk thus concludes that the Delaware statute does not require any
minimum number of shares for a stockholder to qualify for inspection.9 9
(2) The Common Law. Petitioner's standing to inspect is stronger at common law where it is clear that the right to inspect does not rest on record
ownership.100 The petitioner's position is strengthened by the additional 100
shares held in nominee name; the contingent interest in the 241 shares held
in trust is an additional, less persuasive, factor.
98. E.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 624(b); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-312; D.C. CODE
ANN. § 29-920; La. Rev. Stat. § 12:103; Miss. CODE ANN. § 5309-11.
99. See, E. FOLK, supra note 70, at 248.
100. See e.g., Sivin v. Schwartz, 22 App. Div. 2d 821, 254 N.Y.S.2d 914, 915 (1964);
Levine v. Pat-Plaza Amusements, Inc., 324 N.Y.S.2d 145, 148 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
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Although the common law authorities are mixed on the nature of the
equitable ownership required for inspection, 0 1 the unqualified nature of the
beneficial ownership of the owner of shares held in "street" or nominee name
would appear to present the strongest possible case for the right of inspection
by an equitable owner since such owner possesses the full economic interest,
the right to direct the voting of the shares, and the unqualified right to compel
registration in his own name. The limited authority on nominee shares sup102
ports this conclusion.
Although cases are divided on the right of holders of a beneficial interest in
a trust 03 or of pledgors and pledgees (who are not record owners) 1 4 or voting trust certificate holders' 0 5 to inspect thecorporate books and records,
those cases upholding such right obviously support the right of the equitable
owner of shares in nominee name. On the other hand, the decisions to the
contrary are not controlling since each of these cases involves an owner who
lacks full economic ownership or voting rights or both.
The Honeywell Court relied on Chas. A. Day & Co., Inc. v. Booth, 06 in
which inspection of the stock list was denied to a stockholder who held a
single share purchased for the purpose of making a demand for the list. The
Booth decision, however, involved a securities firm which wanted the list for
the purpose of using it in its business, and which had made a practice of purchasing single shares as a method of acquiring access to corporate stock lists
101. See, W.

FLETCHER,

supra note 57, at § 2230; Note, Rights of Equitable Owners

of CorporateShares, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 999, 1000-03 (1951); 17 U. Cm. L. REV. 194,

197-98 (1948). The right of an unregistered stockholder or the equitable owner of
shares to institute a derivative action is well recognized. See, W. CAREY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 924 (4th ed. 1969); H. BALLANTINE, supra note 28, at 351.
If record ownership is not required to maintain an action, it can hardly be asserted as
a prerequisite to the exercise of less fundamental rights of ownership such as the right
of inspection.
102. Feist v. Joseph Dixon Crucible Co., 30 N.J. Super. 153, 103 A.2d 893 (1954);
see, S.F. Bower & Co. v. State, 192 Ind. 462, 137 N.E. 57, 58 (1922); N. LATriN, CORPORATIONs 350 (2d ed. 1971). But cf. State ex rel. Manlin v. Druggists' Addressing Co.,
113 S.W. 2d 1061 (1922).
103. Compare Brecker v. Nielson, 21 Conn. Supp. 33, 143 A.2d 463 (1958) (inspec-

tion denied to "trust beneficiaries") with McGeary v. Brown 23 S.D. 573, 122 N.W. 605
(1909) (inspection granted to life tenant) and Texas Infra-Red Radiant Company, Inc.
v. Erwin 397 S.W.2d 491 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965) (inspection granted to former wife
with beneficial interest in stock held by trustee pursuant to divorce decree).
104. Compare Leisner v. Kent Investors, Inc. 62 Misc. 2d 132, 307 N.Y.S.2d 293
(Sup. Ct. 1970) (pledgor granted inspection); In re Citizens' Savings & Trust Co., 156
Wis. 277, 145 N.W. 646 (1914) and Newcomer v. Miller, 166 Md. 675, 172 A. 242
(1934) (pledgees granted inspection) with In re First Nat. Bank of Brooklyn, 28 Misc.
662, 59 N.Y.S. 1042 (1899), aff'd, 44 App. Div..635, 60 N.Y. Supp. 1138 (1900)

(pledgee denied inspection).
105. Compare Baczkowska v. 2166 Operating Corp., 304 N.Y. 811, 109 N.E.2d 470
(1952) and Webster v. Bartlett Estate Co. 35 Cal. App. 283, 169 P. 702 (1917) (inspection granted) with State ex rel. Crowder v. Sperry Corp., 41 Del. 84, 15 A.2d 661 (Sup.
Ct. 1940) (Mandamus to compel inspection denied although possibility of equitable
relief left open).
106. 123 Me. 443, 447, 123 A. 577, 558 (1924).
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for use in its business, and of disposing of the shares after obtaining the lists
in question. There are a number of such cases, some similarly involving the
holder of a single share, which reach the same result. 107 All these cases clearly
turn on the petitioner's contemplated improper use of the list rather than on
the size of his stock interest.
The Court also relied on two old New York common law cases denying
inspection of books and records by stockholders holding what the Honeywell
08
Although these
Court described as "an insignificant amount of stock.'
cases do refer to the small size of the stock interest (75 preferred shares in
one case, 4 shares in the other), it does not appear that this element was the
decisive factor in either case.
In contrast, there are numerous common law cases granting inspection
without regard to the number of shares held. 0 9
It does not seem therefore, that the Honeywell Court is sound either under
the statute or at common law in implying that the allegedly "tenuous" nature
of petitioner's stock interest might disqualify him from any relief.
The authorities, however, largely involve inspection of the stock list which
represents a minimum intrusion into corporate affairs. The problems presented by inspection of books and records generally in the large public corporation might well induce courts to conclude that a balancing of the various interests involved should lead to a denial of the right of inspection where
minimal stock ownership is involved. In such event, it is likely that the decision would be expressed in terms of "proper purpose" or relation of the
inspection to furtherance of the stockholder's interest rather than in terms
of standing. The underlying factor, however, would be the smallness of the
stockholder's holding.
In the public interest proxy contest, there seems little remaining resistance
to the right of the holder of the single share to place a proposal on the proxy
statement although it is plain that he is acting on behalf of public concerns
rather than for the advancement of stockholder interests. It is not all clear that
the same tolerance will be extended to the holder of the single share or even
100 shares desiring a massive inspection of books and records. The authorities
upholding inspection of the stock list, notwithstanding the applicant's limited
stock interest, should not be regarded as necessarily controlling.

107. E.g., State ex rel. Theile v. Cities Service Co., 31 Del. 514, 115 A. 773 (1922);
Eaton v. Manter, 114 Me. 259, 95 A. 948 (1915).
108. People ex rel. Hunter v. National Park Bank, 122 App. Div. 635, 107 N.Y.S.
369 (1907); Matter of Pierson, 28 Misc. 726, 59 N.Y.S. 1003 (Sup. Ct. 1899), afl'd,
44 App. Div. 215, 60 N.Y.S. 671 (1899).
109. E.g., G.S. & M. Co. v. Dixon, 220 Ga. 329, 138 S.E.2d 662 (1964) (3/4 of
share involved): In re O'Neill, 47 Misc. 495, 95 N.Y.S. 964 (1905); see, Richmond v.
App. 179, 180-81 (1909); Matter of Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 53 N.E.
Hill, 148 Ill.
1103, 1107 (1899); 28 U. CIN. L. REV. 116, 117 (1959).
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B. Acquisition of Shares Solely to Obtain Inspection
The remaining question is whether petitioner is disqualified because he
purchased the 101 shares in question solely to obtain the right of inspection.
(1) The Statute. As noted, Section 220 contains no requirement that
stock must have been held for a minimum period in order to qualify for
inspection in contrast to the number of statutes containing such a prerequisite for relief. Accordingly, three recent Delaware decisions make it plain that
the fact that the stock was acquired solely to qualify for inspection will not bar
0
relief under the statute."
In light of these decisions which the Court ignored, petitioner's right to relief under the Delaware statute is not barred by his purchase of stock for the
purpose of obtaining the stockholder's right of inspection.
(2) The Common Law. The foregoing Delaware decisions may also be
regarded as supporting the common law right of inspection of the stockholder
who acquired his shares to qualify for inspection. The decisions do not turn
on the statutory provisions-although the statutory language clearly supports
the result-and reflect the position that a shareholder is a shareholder without
regard to the concerns that prompted the acquisition of the shares.
C. The Policy of the Securities and Exchange Commission
The Honeywell Court, furthermore, ignored the experience of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Thus, the Commission both in drafting and
construing its proxy rules, Regulation 14A, under the 1934 Act, has permitted shareholder proposals by the holder of a single share or by the holder
of shares concededly purchased for the purpose of submitting a shareholder
proposal for inclusion in the corporate proxy statement.," Although at one
time there was an intimation that during its recent review of Rule 14a-8 the
Commission was considering a minimum number of shares and a minimum
time of holding in order to qualify for submission of a stockholder proposal,
the recent amendments to Rule 14a-8 which became effective January 1, 1973
contained no such requirements.
The foregoing review makes it plain that the intimation in the Honeywell
decision that plaintiff may lack standing is not sound. Nevertheless, social
reform groups seeking to obtain inspection of corporate books and records
would obviously be well advised to act where possible through stockholders
with significant holdings who have owned their shares for some time.
110. Mite Corp. v. Heli-Coil Corp., 256 A.2d 855 (Del. Ch. 1969); General Time
Corp. v. Talley Industries, 43 Del. Ch. 531, 240 A.2d 755 (Sup. Ct. 1968), 1970 DuKE
L. J. 393, 404 n. 73 (1970); Trans-World Airlines, Inc. v. State ex rel. Porerie, 54 Del.
582, 183 A.2d 174 (1962), 4 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 425 (1963). But cf. Northwest
Industries v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 260 A.2d 428 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1969).
111. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14 (1972); see, note 18 supra.

